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mislead and confuse them. We conclude that 
of error is well founded in the 
entire record, that a of is shown. 
The is reversed. 
[L.A. No. 23779. In Bank. Dec. 30, 1955.] 
BERNARD P. CALHOUN, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR 
COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY et al., Respondents. 
[1] Elections-Offenses-Solicitation of Campaign Contributions 
From Licensees.-Elec. Code, § 5002.5, prohibiting elective offi-
cers empowered to issue licenses from soliciting or receiving 
campaign contributions from licensees, is constitutional, since 
what might begin as an innocent request or acceptance of a 
contribution from a licensee might ripen into a demand with 
which the licensee must comply in order to enjoy the privileges 
of his license, and since there is a reasonable basis for the 
conclusion that the danger of corrupt practice is greater in 
the case of the official having direct influence on the right of 
the licensee to conduct his business than in other situations. 
[2] Indictment and Information-Motion to Set Aside.-An indict-
ment will not be set aside or a prosecution thereon prohibited 
if there is a rational ground for the conclusion that an offense 
has been committed and the accused is guilty of it. 
[3] Conspiracy-Criminal-Indictment.-Direct proof of a formal 
understanding between parties to a conspiracy is not required 
as the basis of an indictment or information. 
[4] Grand Jury-Proceedings-Evidence.-In a proceeding in pro-
hibition to restrain a trial on an indictment charging a 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Elections, § 232 et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jnr.2d, Indictment and Information, § 78 et seq.; 
Am.Jur., Indictment and Information, § 138 et seq. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Conspiracy, § 20 et seq.; Am.Jur., Conspiracy, 
§ 29 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Elections, § 153; Indictment and 
Information, § 88; Conspiracy,§ 14; [ 4, 6-8] Grand Jury, § 30.5; 
[5] Conspiracy, § 5. 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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the 
program in other ways than as a mere donor, 
defendant in the officer's office directly dealing or 
with persons supplying or doing campaign 
work for such showed a direct link between defendant 
and the proceeds from solicitation of retail liquor licensees, 
and showed that he "received'' money for the oftlcer's 
Conspiracy-Criminal-To Commit Acts Injurious to Public 
Morals.--Pen. Code, § 182, subd. 5, establishing a punishment 
for conspiracy to commit any act injurious to the public morals 
and to pervert and obstruct justice, is constitutional. 
Grand Jury-Proceedings-Evidence.-In a proceeding in pro-
hibition to restrain a trial on an indictment alleging· that 
defendant and an elective officer with others conspired to do 
acts injurious to the public morals and to pervert and obstruct 
justice (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. 5), the evidence supported 
the indictment where it could reasonably be inferred therefrom 
that defendant and the officer acted together to use the 
officer's oftlcial position as a member of the Board of Equaliza-
tion for their private gain by collecting funds from licensees 
and applicants for licenses from such board. 
Id.-Proceedings-Evidence.-In a proceeding in prohibition 
to restrain a trial on an indictment alleging that defendant 
and an elective officer agreed to prepare false papers and 
records for fraudulent purposes on trials, proceedings and 
inquiries authorized by law, the indictment is supported by 
evidence showing use by a printer of fictitious ledger accounts 
to show funds received from defendant and the otlicer, checks 
given to a nonexistent printing company, the substitution of 
a new check for that made out by a contributor to the officer's 
campaign fund, and other acti,,ities which, a reasonable grand 
juror might infer, were done with the intent to disguise their 
nature. 
[8] Id.-Proceedings-Evidence.-In a proceeding in prohibition to 
restrain a trial on an indictment, a contention that the trial 
judge was biased against defendant in ruling on his motion 
to set aside the indictment does not affect the legal sufficiency 
of the evidence to justify the indictment for purposes of the 
petition for prohibition; such objection should be presented 
at the time of trial. 
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PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of San County and John A. Hewicker, Judge 
from requiring petitioner to stand trial on an indict-
ment. Writ denied. 
& Schall, John W. Preston and Charles H. Carr 
for Petitioner. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Deputy Attorney General, James Don Keller, District Attor-
ney (San Diego), Barton C. Sheela, Jr., and Jack R. Levitt, 
Deputy District Attorneys, for Respondents. 
EDMONDS, J.-Bernard P. Calhoun was indicted by the 
grand jury which accused him of having conspired with others 
to commit certain acts in violation of the Elections Code. 
this proceeding, he is endeavoring to prohibit the superior 
court from requiring him to stand trial upon these charges. 
In count one of the indictment, Calhoun is alleged to have 
conspired with William G. Bonelli and others to commit the 
crime of soliciting, asking and receiving contributions from 
persons licensed by the Board of Equalization to sell alcoholic 
beverages. 'rhese contributions were solicited and received, 
it is charged, for use in campaigns for the reelection of Bonelli 
as a member of the Board of Equalization. 
The second count asserts that Calhoun and Bonelli, with 
others, conspired "to do acts injurious to the public morals 
and to pervert and obstruct justice'' (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. 
in that they agreed together to use Bonelli's official position 
as a member of the Board of Equalization for their private 
gain by collecting funds from licensees and applicants for 
licenses from the Board of Equalization. 
Other acts characterized as being contrary to section 182, 
subdivision 5, of the Penal Code are specified in count three 
of the indictment. In this count, Calhoun and Bonelli are 
charged with having agreed to prepare false papers and 
records for fraudulent purposes upon trials, proceedings and 
inquiries authorized by law. 
Principally, the evidence presented to the grand jury 
pertains to contributions made by wholesale licensees and by 
retail licensees in San Diego and Los Angeles Counties. Sim-
ilar operations were carried on in Orange, Riverside and 
San Bernardino Counties. This evidence, with the inferences 
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activity in San Diego County. Substantially the same 
was followed in the other counties. 
In 1950 and 1954 Bonelli was a candidate for reelection 
to the Board of Equalization. Shortly before the 1950 cam-
·wmiam Cook, who was ''public relations man'' for 
met with Charles E. Berry, Liquor Control Officer 
San Diego and Imperial Counties. They discussed the 
of soliciting campaign contributions from retail liquor 
licensees. At their request AI Tossas, a former liquor sales-
man, agreed, for certain compensation, to take charge of work 
making these solicitations. Berry, Cook, Frank Bompen-
and Ray McCullough assisted Tossas. 
Tossas was furnished with ''pretty thorough'' lists of bars, 
stores, markets, hotels, and similar establishments with 
a notation beside the name of the licensee as to the amount 
the ''contribution'' expected from him. Following the 
"canned sales talk," Tossas would ask the licensee if he 
thought that Bonelli was "head of the liquor industry" and 
if it were not worth the amount specified on the list for him 
to have Bonelli reelected. The ''contribution'' almost in-
variably made was accepted with the understanding that it 
was to promote Bonelli's campaign. 
Many of the licensees solicited had liquor violation charges 
then pending against them. Although Tossas was specifically 
instructed by Cook not to say that the contribution would 
affect the pending charges, those whose licenses were being 
questioned gave "more generously" than others. 
Cook instructed Tossas to get a "certain amount" of cash. 
Checks were to be made payable to the National Democratic 
Club of California, the Aldine Printing Company, or the 
Woolever Press. A check, made payable to the Bonelli cam-
fund, was not accepted. Some such checks were re-
turned to the licensee with the request that it be made payable 
to one of the designated payees. 
From time to time Cook told Tossas that a sufficient number 
of checks drawn in favor of one of the three designated payees 
been received and that thereafter checks should be made 
out to one of the other payees. All cash and checks received 
Tossas, which he estimated amounted to between $15,000 
and $20,000, were turned over by him to Cook. There is no 
direct evidence as to how the payees obtained these checks 
but the record shows that they received some of them. Cook 
Tossas $1,500 as compensation for his services. 
Early in 1954, Joseph Cannon set up campaign headquar-
22 CALHOUN v. SuPERIOR [46 C.2d 
ters in San the operation of which he later turned 
over to Dorothy Hall J ahant, who had done the same work 
in the 1950 campaign. Ray McCullough was placed in charge 
of obtaining contributions. Collections were made from licen-
sees named in lists furnished to McCullough, ''in the same 
manner'' as in the 1950 campaign. McCullough was assisted 
by Girolamo Cusenza and Cannon. Some of the contributions 
obtained them were made in cash. also received 
checks made to one of them. These checks were 
cashed them and the proceeds turned over to McCullough. 
The record also shows that checks were received made pay-
able to the National Democratic Club of California, the Aldine 
Printing Company, or the 'N oolever Press. A check from the 
Mexican Village, a liquor licensee, which had been made pay-
able to the Bonelli campaign fund, was returned with direc-
tions to make it payable to one of the named payees. Other 
checks from liquor licensees, drawn in favor of the campaign 
fund, were received by Mrs. J ahant and turned over to Cannon 
or McCullough. 
Approximately $8,000 was received by McCullough. Cash 
and checks received by him were placed in sealed envelopes 
and given to Mrs. Jahant for delivery to the National Demo-
cratic Club of California. She testified that she delivered 
one su<ih envelope to the secretary of Nate Snyder, secretary-
treasurer of the club, and one to Bonelli's secretary. Charles 
Berry testified that Nate Snyder was the person designated 
to receive contributions to that organization. 
In the Long Beach area, members of the Long Beach Tavern 
Association collected contributions from licensees. The money 
was solicited for use in Bonelli's campaign and to defeat 
Proposition 3. These purposes were decided upon in tavern 
association meetings in which Albert Eisenberg, the associa-
tion's attorney, acted as the representative of Bonelli. Con-
tributions were made by checks made payable to the National 
Democratic Club of California, the Aldine Printing Company, 
the vV oolever Press, and a fictitious company designated as 
the ''Allied Printers'' or ''Allied Printing Company.'' 
Nate Snyder described the National Democratic Club of 
California as an organization consisting of a board of directors 
who were its officers. I_Jeonard vVilson was president; R. S. 
Sparks, vice-president; and Snyder, secretary-treasurer. Ac-
cording to Snyder, he had been authorized by the board to 
make disbursements to various candidates for political offices, 
largAly in his own discretion. He was the only person author-
CALHOUN v. SuPERIOR CoUR'l" 
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cheeks on the account. 'rhe corpora-
did not solicit contributions. He testified that 
endorsed checks from retail liquor licensees but denied 
out money toward Bonelli's campaign 
a slate of candidates which included 
told the that one week 
was he told that he was president of 
National Democratic Club of California. He had no 
of the functioning of that organization, he said; 
not authorized the use of his name as its president 
the expenditure of funds by Snyder and, as far as he 
. he had never been a member of the club. 
With regard to contributions by wholesale licensees, the 
shows these facts : 
The Southern California Business Men's Association is a 
organization of men in the hotel, restaurant, grocery, 
distilled spirits, beer, wine, manufacturing and retail 
businesses. Dues are contributed regularly by its members. 
money is expended for trade publications and similar 
purposes, Some political contributions are made, but they 
consist generally of printing in trade publications of slates 
of candidates endorsed by the association. At the times of 
the Bonelli campaigns, Calhoun was one of its 50 directors 
and Albert vVeigel its executive vice-president. 
Calhoun also is general counsel and ''public relations man'' 
the Southern California Spirits Foundation, an association 
of all but one of the major wholesale liquor dis-
tributors in the Los Angeles area. He had no authority to 
checks on the Spirits Foundation account, but he was 
carte blanche in the political use of its funds. He often 
reeeived signed checks made out in blank. The association 
regular dues to the Business Men's Association. 
a meeting called by A.rthur Samish in 1947, it was 
decided to establish a "Research and Public Relations Fund," 
to reeeive contributions for use in campaigns affecting the 
alcoholic beverage industry and to support some political can-
didates. Originally, this was a bank account of the Busi-
l\ien 's Association; later the account was also used by 
11onmembers as a depositary for contributions. 
first the expense of the campaign in opposition to a 
~'"~-~~~ business tax was paid from this fund. Later oppo-
sition to a tax on alcoholic beverages was financed from it. 
was generally collected, when a need was anticipated, 
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those participating in the maintenance 
the association decided to reactivate the fund for 
use to Proposition 3 which was to be voted on 
in November. Because some members were reluctant to make 
until all had participated, their contributions were 
in a special account. However, during that year 
deposits were made in the fund account. The bulk of 
them came from the Spirits Foundation, but several thousands 
of dollars were contributed by the California Brewers Insti-
tute and the Bohemian Distributing Company. These deposits 
were ''directed'' and ''arranged'' by Calhoun. 
Five persons, including Calhoun and vV eigel, were author-
ized to sign checks on the fund account, the signatures of 
any two of them being required. As a practical matter, 
however, Calhoun exercised complete control over the expendi-
ture of the money. Generally, he would present a check to 
Weigel who signed it without inquiry as to its purpose. 
Substantial amounts were drawn by checks made payable to 
cash. Other checks, pursuant to Calhoun's instructions, were 
made out in payment of bills. Of the funds used, Calhoun 
could" account for less than 10 per cent as having been used 
in connection with Proposition 3. As to other payments, 
he claimed the privilege against self-incrimination. 
Records maintained by '\Veigel, however, showed that numer-
ous checks were drawn on this account in payment of bills 
presented by the Woolever Press, the Civic Research Press, 
Aldine Printing Company and the Kennedy Outdoor Adver-
tising Company for expenses in connection with the Bonelli 
campaign. vV eigel pressed Calhoun for receipts showing the 
purpose for which cash withdrawals were expended. Several 
of the receipts given to him came from a book in the office 
of Bonelli. 
On one occasion, the Aldine Printing Company billed the 
Southern California Business Men's Association for $3,000, 
as the charge for printing some booklets. When Weigel 
inquired of Calhoun concerning this bill he was told to write 
a check on the public relations fund for $1,500, which he 
did. Later, he received a bill for the balance of $1,507. 
When he again mentioned the matter to Calhoun, he was 
told to draw a check on the fund for $1,507 payable to himself 
as trustee. He did so and turned the cash over to Calhoun. 
Later, Calhoun presented a receipt from the Aldine Printing 
Company for that amount. The record shows, however, that 
this receipt did not represent a cash payment but was given 
I 
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to acknowledge receipt of several small checks made payable 
to Aldine. It is a reasonable inference that these checks were 
from retail liquor licensees either in San Diego or Long Beach. 
Harold Judson testified that Bonelli, by telephone, informed 
that someone would visit him with regard to Proposi-
3. Later Bonelli again telephoned to Judson about "the 
he had spoken about previously" and asked Judson 
he would cash a check as an accommodation. Judson 
giving Bonelli's messenger $5,000 for a check drawn 
the account of the Southern California Spirits Foundation. 
check made payable to James Garibaldi, as trustee, was 
nauu.,'"u in the same way. At Calhoun's request, a check for 
on the account of the Spirits Foundation was cashed 
Garibaldi's secretary and the proceeds delivered to Cal-
houn's messenger. The purpose of this check ostensibly was for 
work in connection with the campaign against Proposition 3. 
The record shows that a major part of Bonelli's campaign 
printing and advertising was done by the Woolever Press, 
the Aldine Printing Company, the Kennedy Outdoor Adver-
Company and George West. Describing the manner 
in which printing is provided for political campaigns, Charles 
Woolever, of the \Voolever Press, testified that customarily 
someone guarantees a candidate's printing bill for a certain 
amount. Upon notification by the printer of the guarantee, 
the candidate orders specific work to be done. The bill is 
by campaign contributions either given directly to him 
from the contributor or furnished by the candidate. 
In 1950, Bonelli's printing bill was guaranteed by the 
National Democratic Club of California; in 1954, his guar-
antors included the Southern California Spirits Foundation. 
Woolever and Bonelli agreed upon the printing to be done. 
Most of the bills were paid by checks of third persons made 
payable to .. Woolever. 
Several checks were identified as those of retail liquor 
licensees in the Long Beach and San Diego areas delivered 
to ·woolever by messenger. Some of these checks were applied 
to Bonelli's printing bills; others were cashed by Woolever, 
and the proceeds given to the messenger. According to Wool-
evcr, he knew that some of the money from checks he cashed 
was returned to Bonelli. 
During the 1954 primary election campaign, Bonelli called 
Woolever to his office and presented to him a number of 
checks, aggregating about $2,300, made payable to the Wool-
ever Press and the Allied Printing Company, a fictitious 
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company. These checks were cashed by Woolever at Bonelli's 
request and the money given to his messenger. Among the 
checks received by Woolever was one signed by Calhoun and 
Weigel drawn on the Research and Public Relations Fund. 
Later Bonelli asked Woolever to set up a ledger account 
for printing work to be done during the general election 
campaign for the ''Committee on Proposition 3. '' Woolever 
testified, however, that he did not do any printing in con-
nection with Proposition 3. Instead, at Bonelli's request, 
he charged this account with three checks, aggregating some 
$4,100, payable to Leo Katcher, whom the record shows to 
have been the author of a book entitled "Billion Dollar Black-
jack." The book was published by George West for the Civic 
Research Press, a company formed by Bonelli. As payment 
for these checks, Woolever was given checks aggregating some 
$1,275, payable to Woolever and written by third persons, 
about $1,000 in cash from Bonelli, and a check for $4,250 
drawn on the account of the Southern California Spirits 
Foundation. At Bonelli's request, Woolever cashed the latter 
check, keeping $1,975 for himself and paying the balance 
to Bonelli. 
Bonelli requested Woolever to bill some $4,414 worth of 
printing to the ''Veterans Committee for Bonelli.'' As 
partial payment for this bill, in Bonelli's office, Calhoun 
gave Woolever a check for $1,000. A few days later, also 
in Bonelli's office, Woolever received from Calhoun a check 
for $500. Both checks were drawn on the account of the 
Research and Public Relations Fund. 
Harold Feinstein, the proprietor of the Aldine Printing 
Company, testified that he had regularly done printing work 
in Bonelli's campaigns and required no guarantee. In 1950, 
such work was charged by him to an account in the name 
of Ed Levine, identified as having done solicitation work for 
Bonelli in Los Angeles County. On at least two occasions 
in that campaign, Feinstein furnished fictitious invoices to 
cover work paid for by a wholesale liquor licensee. In the 
1954 campaigns, money to finance Bonelli's campaign printing 
was received by Aldine from the Republican Committee for 
Bonelli, the Spirits Foundation, the Research and Public 
Relations Fund and retail liquor licensees in San Diego 
and Long Beach. 
George Kennedy testified that he first met Calhoun in 
1950 in the personal office of William G. Bonelli. At that 
time they discussed Bonelli's entire outdoor advertising cam-
paign for the primary election. A short time later Calhoun, 
L 
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ordered certain and directed him to 
the work to the National Democratic Club of California . 
. c'"couw~~.r did so and his bill was paid by the check of that club. 
for the 1954 general election campaign was 
for in a similar manner. Bonelli discussed with 
the various plans of coverage. Calhoun ordered the work 
and directed that it be billed to the Research and Public 
HGHHAV""J Fund. Calhoun also decided to use some of the 
for advertising Bonelli's book, the ''Billion Dollar 
.uL<:.v••.,~v ... '' Kennedy put up the posters which he received. 
The only payment received by Kennedy for this work was 
a check for $1,500, drawn on the account of the Research 
Public Relations Fund. 
West, a publisher, told the grand jury that he 
published Bonelli's book, the "Billion Dollar Blackjack." 
The nominal printer and publisher was the Civic Research 
an individual proprietorship owned by Bonelli. Under 
arrangement, West billed Bonelli for a certain amount, 
representing his cost of printing and profit. Bonelli paid a 
portion of the bill by his personal checks or cash. In addi-
upon inquiry by West as to his bill, Bonelli called him 
to his office. Calhoun was present and either he or Bonelli 
gave West a check for $3,000 signed by Calhoun and drawn 
on the account of the Research and Public Relations Fund. 
\Vilbur Bassett testified that he was secretary-treasurer of 
the Los .Angeles .Allied Printing Trades Council, a trade union 
\Yhich published the ''Southland Almanac.'' In 1954, the 
council was engaged in a labor controversy with the Los 
lmgeles Times. Bassett asked Bonelli for a contribution and 
was promised $2,500. Payment was made by means of seven 
checks drawn by third persons to ''.Allied Printing,'' ''.Allied 
Printing Council'' and ''.Allied Printing Co.,'' which were 
obtained by Bassett's messenger at Bonelli's office. 
In support of his petition for a writ of prohibition, Calhoun 
urges that the evidence before the grand jury furnishes 
no reasonable basis for the charges against him. He also 
contends that the writ should issue because the trial judge 
expressed bias and prejudice against him in ruling upon 
his motion to set aside or quash the indictment. Finally, 
he attacks both section 5002.5 of the Elections Code1 and 
1
'' § 5002.5. Solicitation or receipt of money, etc. from licensee or 
lieense holder. Any elective State officer who is authorized by law to 
issue licenses, or who is a member of any board or ageney authorized 
to issue licenses, or ~ny person seeking election to such office, board or 
agency, or any appomtee or employee of such office, board or agency, 
28 CAI1HOUN v. SuPERIOR CouRT r 46 c.2d 
section 182, subdivision 5, of the Penal Code2 as being un-
constitutional. 
Calhoun argues that section 5002.5 of the Elections Code 
creates an unreasonably narrow classification of persons from 
whom campaign contributions may not be solicited or received. 
There is no reasonable basis, he asserts, for setting licensees 
apart from other persons who might contribute to a political 
campaign. 
In Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 [1 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed. 
232], the court held constitutional a statute prohibiting cer-
tain federal officers and employees from giving political 
contributions to, or receiving them from, each other. "If 
contributions from those in public employment may be so-
licited by others in official authority," said the court, "it is 
easy to see that what begins as a request may end as a demand, 
and that a failure to meet the demand may be treated by 
those having the power of removal as a breach of some sup-
posed duty growing out of the political relations of the 
parties." (P. 374; cf. United States v. Wurzbach, .. 280 U.S. 
396 [50 S.Ct. 167, 74 L.Ed. 508] [holding constitutional a 
similar statute under which the defendant was indicted for 
receiving and being concerned in receiving specified sums in 
violation of it]; United Pttblic Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 
75 [67 S.Ct. 556, 91 !J.Ed. 754] [holding the Hatch Act 
constitutional].) 
[1] Similarly, the Legislature might reasonably conclude 
that the same danger exists in the case of an elective officer 
empowered to issue licenses. What might begin as an inno-
cent request or acceptance of a contribution from a licensee 
might ripen into a demand with which the licensee must 
comply in order to enjoy the privileges of his license. 
Calhoun contends, however, that there is no reasonable basis 
for limiting the prohibitions of such a statute to elective state 
officers authorized by law to issue licenses. Similar dangers 
exist, he urges, in the case of any other elective officer having 
the power to favor one making a political contribution. 
Furthermore, he argues, the statute has been applied dis-
who directly or indirectly solicits, receives or agrees to receive any money 
or other thing of value, or any promise thereof, from any licensee named 
in, or any holder of, any license issued by such officer, board or agency, 
or from any agent of such licensee or license holder, for any political 
campaign of any person seeking election or reelection to the office, board 
or agency authorized to issue such license, is guilty of a misdemeanor.'' 
2Subdivision 5 makes punishable a conspiracy "[to] commit any act 
injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to pervert or obstruct 
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in that there has been no previous prosecution 
Undoubtedly the statute is narrowly drawn and this 
may account for the absence of previous prosecutions 
it. The Legislature, however, is free to recognize 
""'''""''""of evil'' and deal with the ones which it deems most 
(West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 
[57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703, 108 A.L.R. 1330]; Tigner v. 
310 U.S. 141, 147 [60 S.Ct. 879, 84 L.Ed. 1124, 130 
A.L.R. 1321]; United Public Workers v. Mitchell, supra, 330 
75.) There is a reasonable basis for the conclusion 
the danger of corrupt practice is greater in the case 
the official having direct influence upon the right of the 
licensee to conduct his business than in other situations. 
[2] An indictment will not be set aside or a prosecution 
thereon prohibited if there is a rational ground for the con-
clusion that an offense has been committed and the accused 
guilty of it. (Bompensiero v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 
183-184 [281 P.2d 250] .) [3] Discussing the require-
ments for a showing of probable cause in a prosecution for 
conspiracy, the court stated in the Bompensiero case, quoting 
from Lorenson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 49, 57-58 [216 
P.2d 859], " 'Direct proof of a formal understanding be-
tween parties to the conspiracy is not required as the basis 
of an indictment or information. "[Ilt was not necessary 
for the State to prove that the parties actually came together, 
mutually discussed their common design, and after reaching 
a formal agreement set out upon their previously agreed 
course of conduct. The extent of the assent of minds which 
are involved in a conspiracy may be, and from the secrecy 
of the crime usually must be, inferred by the jury from the 
of the facts and circumstances which, when taken 
apparently indicate that they are parts to the 
same complete whole." ' " (P. 184.) 
In attacking the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
count I of the indictment, Calhoun urges that it establishes 
his participation as a donor, or the agent of a donor, 
in the making of contributions to Bonelli's campaigns. He 
relies upon the rule, to which this court referred in denying 
a petition for hearing in People v. Keyes, 103 Cal.App. 624, 
646 [284 P. 1096], which precludes prosecution for conspiracy 
to commit a substantive offense when the only concert of 
action shown is that necessary to consummate the substantive 
offense. ( Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 [53 S.Ct. 
30 CALHOUN v. SUPERIOR COURT [46 C.2d 
77 L.Ed. 206, 84 A.L.R. 370] ; notes, 26 So.Cal.L.Rev. 64, 
70; 23 So.Cal.L.Rev. 262.) There is little dispute, however, 
that the evidence shows an elaborate conspiracy to utilize 
contributions from both retail and wholesale liquor licensees 
to finance Bonelli's political campaigns. Inferences which 
reasonably may be drawn from that evidence fully support 
the conclusion that Calhoun was connected with the general 
program of the Bonelli campaigns in other ways than solely 
as a donor to them. 
The testimony of several witnesses places Calhoun in 
Bonelli's office directly dealing or negotiating with persons 
supplying printing or doing campaign work for Bonelli. 
Kennedy visited Bonelli's office and, at a few times, saw 
Calhoun there. On Kennedy's first call, Calhoun and Bonelli 
discussed with him all of the outdoor advertising coverage 
to be used in the campaign. Calhoun negotiated for billboard 
space and placed all of the orders with Kennedy for Bonelli's 
advertising. In1950, he directed Kennedy to bill the National 
Democratic Club of California for the work. This is a direct 
link between Calhoun and the proceeds from solicitation of 
retail liquor licensees, for the evidence demonstrates that 
the club was a recipient of such contributions, and there is 
nothing to show that the Spirits Foundation was in any 
way connected with the club. From that evidence, a reason-
able grand juror would be justified in drawing the inference 
that Calhoun knew that the club would be receiving funds 
to be made available to Bonelli, and the source of such funds. 
Other testimony placing Calhoun in Bonelli's office included 
that of West and Woolever, each of whom received a check 
from Calhoun for services rendered for Bonelli. 
Other evidence connecting Calhoun with retail licensee 
contributions includes the testimony of Weigel and Feinstein 
regarding the transaction by which Calhoun obtained a ficti-
tious receipt to cover his cash withdrawal of $1,500. That 
he could obtain a receipt for checks received from retail liquor 
licensees is reasonable ground for an inference that he had 
knowledge of the manner in which Bonelli's printing from 
Aldine was being financed. Also, Woolever said that he told 
only Bonelli of the balance owing on his 1954 primary election 
bill, but he was paid in full by a check directly traceable 
to Calhoun which exactly closed out the account. This evi-
dence indicates a much more intimate participation in Bonel-
li's campaigns than that of one who acted solely as a donor. 
The indictment also might be based upon the use of the 
funds of the Spirits Foundation and those deposited in the 
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of their funds for an unlawful purpose and 
them for the purpose of Bonelli's 
agent rather than for the association. 
thousands of dollars, in addition to those received 
the Spirits li'oundation, were deposited in the Research 
and Public Relations Fund by wholesale liquor licensees of 
1dwm Calhoun was not an agent. This is direct evidence 
Calhoun "received" money for Bonelli's campaign and 
his intimate participation in Bonelli's campaign it is 
a reasonable inference that he acted in concert with Bonelli 
in so. 
'rhere is no merit in the contention that subdivision 5 
of section 182 of the Penal Code is unconstitutionaL The con-
stitutionality of this statute was expressly upheld in Lorenson 
,-. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 49, 59-61 [216 P.2d 859], and 
v. Sullivan, 113 Cal.App.2d 510, 519 [248 P.2d 520]. 
eontrary to Calhoun's contention, full consideration 
m1s given to the decision in JJJusser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 [68 
S.Ct. 397, 92 L.Ed. 562). (See People v. F·htllivan, at pp. 
522-523.) 
[6] The evidence is amply sufficient to support the 
alleged in counts II and III. There is ground for 
an inference that Bonelli and Calhoun acted in concert to 
use Bonelli's position for their private gain in the ,Judson 
and Garibaldi transactions. In the former, a Spirits Pounda-
tion eheck payable to Judson and, it may reasonably be 
dra-wn by Calhoun or at his direction, was cashed 
and the proceeds delivered to Bonelli's messenger. Similarly, 
in the Garibaldi transaction Calhoun received cash from a 
cheek ostensibly made to aid the opposition to Proposition 3, 
which has not been accounted for. Other cash withdrawals 
made by Calhoun from the research fund depend upon his 
statements as to their use or receipts supplied by him. Some 
of the receipts came from a book in Bonelli's office and one, 
from the Aldine Company, was shown to have been given 
for purpose different from that represented. In several 
instances, checks from the Spirits Foundation or the Research 
and Public Relations Fund traceable to Calhoun were cashed 
by Bonelli, or used to pay expenses incurred in connection 
with his book. Also, on many occasions Bonelli cashed retail 
~~v'~"'''~·" checks, and, although Calhoun is not directly linked 
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to these transactions, it reasonably might be concluded that 
they were a logical outgrowth of the conspiracy. 
[7] Supporting the charge that Calhoun and Bonelli 
conspired to prepare false papers and records is the evidence 
as to the Aldine receipt, setting up by vVoolever of fictitious 
ledger accounts to evidence funds received from Bonelli and 
Calhoun, the checks given to the nonexistent Allied Printing 
Company, the substitution of a new check for that made 
out by the Mexican Villege to Bonelli's campaign fund, 
Calhoun's use of the Research and Public Relations Fund as 
a channel for remittances from the Spirits Foundation, the 
transactions in the name of the National Democratic Club of 
California, and other activities which, a reasonable grand 
juror might infer, were done with the intent to disguise their 
nature. 
[8] The contention that the trial judge was biased against 
Calhoun in ruling upon his motion to set aside the indictment 
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the evidence to justify 
the indictment insofar as it concerns the present petition. 
If, at the time of trial, Calhoun believes that he will not 
be able to obtain a fair and impartial hearing, he may present 
his objections in the manner specified in section 170 et seq. 
of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
The alternative writ is discharged and the peremptory writ 
is denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
Because of the misleading statements and inferences con-
tained in the majority opinion, I find it necessary to restate 
the facts here involved and to demonstrate that the majority 
has in every instance gone out of its way to "draw" not only 
the inferences most compatible with guilt but has manufac-
tured inferences which it uses as a foundation for layer after 
layer of more manufactured inferences until the entire shaky 
structure collapses of its own weight. The unfortunate result 
of the collapse is that a man, innocent of the crime with which 
he was charged, must stand to answer in a criminal court. 
To anyone who has read and studied the entire lengthy record 
in this case as I have done, the reason for the so-called infer-
ence drawing is obvious-Calhoun rnust be held to answer 
and even though all that is necessary is a ''strong suspicion'' 
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Many unfounded statements are made in the majority 
opinion. The following admission in the majority opinion 
shows conclusively the falsity of the conclusion that Mr. 
Calhoun was guilty as charged : ''Principally, the evidence 
presented to the grand jury pertains to contributions made 
bv wholesale licensees and by retail licensees in San Diego 
• Los Angeles Counties. Similar operations were carried 
on in Orange, Riverside and San Bernardino Counties. This 
eYidence, with the inferences reasonably to be drawn from it, 
shows the following pattern of activity in San Diego County. 
. . . '' The charge against Calhoun was that of solicitation, 
not contribution. All of the facts stated in the majority 
opinion have to do with solicitation of liquor licensees by 
Bonelli and others. This case deals only with Calhoun. 
Before the conclusion of the grand jury may be upheld by 
this court, something must be found which ties Calhoun in 
with the program of solicitation carried on by Bonelli. I will 
show, conclusively, that while the majority opinion rambles 
on and on incoherently with facts proving Bonelli guilty of 
solicitation, there is nothing whatsoever in the record showing 
that Calhoun conspired with him in that program of solici-
tation. 
Petitioner was accused by the grand jury of three counts 
of conspiracy. Count One accused him of the crime of con-
spiracy to violate section 5002.5 of the Elections Code in 
that he, together with William G. Bonelli, and certain others, 
did "wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously combine, conspire, con-
federate, and agree together to commit the crimes of soliciting, 
asking and receiving cash political contributions and contri-
butions of things of monetary value from persons who were 
named in licenses to sell alcoholic beverages issued by the 
Board of Equalization of the State of California, said Board 
being duly authorized to issue said licenses; and to solicit, 
ask and receive cash contributions and contributions of things 
of monetary value from holders of licenses to sell alcoholic 
beverages issued by the Board of Equalization of the State 
of California, said Board being duly authorized to issue said 
licenses, for the use in campaigns for re-election of William G. 
Bonelli as a member from the Fourth District of the Board of 
Equalization of the State of California at times when Wil-
liam G. Bonelli was then and there a duly elected and duly 
member of the Board of Equalization of the State 
California.'' In the second count, petitioner was charged 
conspiring with William G. Bonelli, and others, in that 
46 C.2d-2 
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they did "wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously combine, conspire, 
confederate and agree to do acts injurious to the public morals 
and to pervert and obstruct justice and the due administration 
of the laws; whereas the said WrLJ_,IAM G. BoNELLI from 
January, 1938, until December, 1954, was . . . the duly 
elected member of the Board of Equalization, Fourth District, 
of the State of California; that while acting as such member 
of the Board of Equalization the said WILLIAM G. BoNELLI 
at the official meetings of the duly elected Board of Equaliza-
tion and in his official capacity presented matters for the 
consideration of and made recommendations to the Board 
of Equalization in matters pertaining to the official duties of 
the Board of Equalization; the said WILLIAM G. BoNELLI, 
BERNARD F. [sic] CALHOUN ... did wilfully, unlawfully, 
feloniously combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together 
to use the said William G. Bonelli's official position of mem-
bership of the Board of Equalization . . . for the private 
gain of said co-conspirators in that said defendants and their 
co-conspirators did agree among themselves that they would 
unlawfully collect funds from licensees and applicants for 
licenses of the Board of Equalization for the private gain 
of William G. Bonelli . . . and for the private gain of all 
said defendants and co-conspirators." Count Three charges 
petitioner, William G. Bonelli, and others, "of the crime of 
Conspiracy to do Acts Injurious to Public Morals and to 
Pervert and Obstruct Justice and the Due Administration 
of the Laws (Penal Code 182, subd. 5) committed as follows: 
The said William G. Bonelli and Bernard P. Calhoun [and 
others] did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously combine, con-
spire, confederate and agree together to prepare misleading, 
false and deceitful papers, records and instruments in writing, 
with the intent to allow the same to be produced for fraudu-
lent and deceitful purposes upon trials, proceedings and 
inquiries authorized by law, for the purpose of perverting 
and obstruction (sic] justice and the due administration 
of the law." 
It appears that this matter as it relates to petitioner must 
turn on a construction of section 5002.5 of the Elections Code 
which provides: 
''Any elective State officer who is authorized by law to 
issue licenses or who is a member of any board or agency 
authorized to issue licenses, or any person seeking election 
to such office, board or agency . . . who directly or indirectly 
solicits, receives or agrees to receive any money or other 
thing of value, or any promise thereof, from any licensee 
1 CALHOUN v. SuPERIOR CouRT 
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in, or any holder of, any license issued by such officer, 
or agency . . . for any political campaign of any 
person seeking election or reelection to the office, board or 
agency authorized to issue such license, is guilty of a mis-
demeanor.'' 
Section 182, subdivision 5, of the Penal Code, contains 
conspiracy statute, and makes criminal a conspiracy ''To 
any act injurious to the public health, to public 
or to pervert or obstruct justice, or the due admin-
istration of the laws." 
Petitioner is not a state officer of any kind; he is an attorney 
at law. For many years petitioner has been retained by 
Southern California Spirits Foundation as executive 
secretary, general counsel, labor relations advisor, and public 
relations man. The Southern California Spirits Foundation, 
hereinafter called Spirits Foundation, is a trade association 
·whose membership consists of all but one of the persons, or 
corporations,* engaged in the wholesale liquor business in 
southern California. Spirits Foundation, together with 
Southern California Business Men's Association, another 
group of those interested in the liquor business, and here-
inafter called Business Men's Association, have, for many 
years participated in various political campaigns where issues 
of interest to the industry were involved. These two groups 
throughout the years, contributed sums of money to 
defeat measures thought to be inimical to the welfare of the 
industry, and to promote measures thought to be for 
its best interests. 'l'hey have, also, contributed sums of money 
for the campaigns of various political candidates for local, 
county, state, and federal offices. 
The members of Spirits Foundation were, as has been pre-
stated, those engaged in the wholesale liquor business 
in southern California. 'rhese persons voluntarily associated 
tog'ether for their mutual benefit. Dues were paid on a monthly 
basis and were computed on a gallonage sold basis. The 
' computation was made as the gallonage was reflected 
the members' tax statements to the State of California 
and a 1 per cent or, later, a 1% per cent assessment made 
thereon. Statements of dues owed were mailed each month 
each member of the Foundation. The avowed purposes 
*'l'he one wlwlesaler not a member is a distillery. 'l'his distille1-y 
desired membership but was not acceptable to the :B'oundation as a 
member because it either sold direct to the retailers or desired to do so. 
This procedure would eliminate the wholesaler. 
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of the Spirits Foundation were as heretofore set forth: to 
contribute funds to oppose inimical legislation; to promote 
favorable legislation; to aid financially in the campaigns of 
various candidates for divers public offices; to handle tax 
matters and litigation for the various members, both indi-
vidually and collectively, when it affected the group as a 
whole. A reading of the record shows that petitioner at-
tended all Board of Equalization meetings; that he was 
frequently in Sacramento; that he had copied lists of all 
rules, regulations, laws, relating to the industry, and changes 
therein, and sent these copies to the members of Spirits 
Foundation. The record shows that Mr. Calhoun was given 
carte blanche permission to make the necessary decisions re-
garding the disbursement of Spirits Foundation funds in 
line with the objectives to be achieved. It is also shown that 
members of Spirits Foundation met together several times 
each month. 
The Southern California Business Men's Association is 
an organization of business men who are in the hotel, res-
taurant, grocery, drug, distilled spirits, beer, wine and manu-
facturing businesses. It appears to be a trade association of 
representatives from all the diverse branches of the liquor 
industry, or businesses having any connection therewith. It 
was organized originally for the purpose of assisting in the 
repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment and has, ever since, 
acted as a coordinating agency of the people represented in 
the alcoholic beverage industry. Its source of funds is mem-
bership dues and assessments, or contributions made by the 
regular membership. The association issues slates of recom-
mended candidates and publicizes the recommendations to its 
membership and others. Spirits Foundation is a regular 
member of the Business Men's Association in its function as 
representative of the wholesale liquor dealers. Petitioner is 
a director of Business Men's Association. Business Men's 
Association was also interested in legislation affecting the 
interests of its membership and had special funds set up 
with which to oppose, or advocate such legislation, depending 
on its effect on the industry. Albert V. Weigel acted as execu-
tive vice president and secretary of the association. 
Research and Public Relations Fund was a fund that had 
been established for a number of years prior to the ones under 
consideration and had been set up to take care of matters 
affecting the liquor industry as they were reflected in legis-
lation and to support candidates for various public offices. 
Prior to 1954, however, the Fund had been inactive, although 
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small balance had been carried over from year to year. 
In 1954, the Fund was reactivated primarily for the purpose 
of defeating Proposition 3 at the general election of that 
year. Although five persons were authorized to sign checks 
thereon, each check requiring two signatures, only petitioner 
Mr. \Veigel signed the checks drawn on this account. 
1954 practically all of the monies in the Fund were 
transferred to it from Spirits Foundation. 
The record shows that the members of Southern California 
Business Men's Association agreed at a meeting between 
themselves upon a budget they considered necessary for the 
defeat of Proposition 3. Some of the members were not 
willing that any of these monies be used for that purpose 
until all contributions were in and the budget completed. Mr. 
Calhoun testified that it was for this reason, as well as for 
other reasons of convenience, that funds from Spirits Founda-
tion vvere transferred to the Fund. Mr. Calhoun testified as 
an additional reason for the transfer of fundB and use of 
the Research Fund that he did not sign checks drawn on 
Spirits Foundation although he directed the expenditure of 
its funds. The checks were signed by two officers of the 
Foundation and many times one or the other of these officers 
was unavailable; sometimes one or the other of these officers 
would sign checks in blank, so that if he happened to be out 
of town, the check would require only the one additional 
~ignature. 
'The record shows from a question or statement made by 
J\Ir. Sheela, Deputy District Attorney, to a witness that the 
grand jury proceedings were had on the theory that it was 
unlawful for a licensee to contribute, however voluntarily, 
to the campaign of any member of the board issuing the 
license. Mr. Sheela made this statement to a witness: 
''. . . I will tell you simply, you understand our problem, 
it is against the law for any liquor licensee to contribute to 
the campaign of Mr. Bonelli .... " The pattern was set-
that the prohibition of this statute extended to the donor as 
well as the donee.* Since there was ample evidence that Mr. 
Calhoun's organization contributed to Bonelli's campaign, 
it is obvious that the grand jury could have been, and un-
doubtedly was, under the impression that Mr. Calhoun was 
•·while section 5002.6 of the Elections Code prohibits a licensee from 
making a contribution to the political campaign of a person seeking 
election to the ''office, board or agency authorized to issue such license.'' 
this section is not involved here. 
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accused of such contributions in violation of section 5002.6 
of the Elections Code. 'l'his was not the case-~he was charged 
with conspiracy to solicit-not to give. 
The entire record deals with Bonelli and his program of 
solicitation from retail liquor licensees and inasmuch as the 
jury was informed that it was against the law for any liquor 
licensee to contribute, it is obvious that Mr. Calhoun was 
caught in the gigantic net spread to catch those soliciting 
when he, in truth and in fact, only donated-a crime with 
which he was not charged. The theory of the prosecution 
could only have had the effect of causing untold confusion 
in the minds of the jurors and to make it now impossible 
to ascertain whether the grand jury considered him guilty 
of conspiracy to solicit or to give. Petitioner here claimed 
his constitutional provilege against self-incrimination when 
questions were asked him concerning Mr. Bonelli, or his cam-
paign. He also refused to answer questions concerning 
S. Ernest Roll, District Attorney of Los Angeles County, the 
Honorable Goodwin J. Knight, Governor of California, and 
Attorney General Edmund G. Brown. 
There is not one scintilla of evidence in the record that 
the association of wholesale liquor dealers in Spirits Founda-
tion was other than voluntary; there is absolutely no evidence 
which would show, or even tend to show, that Spirits Founda-
tion was organized at the instance of Mr. Bonelli, or Mr. 
Calhoun, either singly or together, for any purpose. There 
is nothing in the record to show that the funds received by 
Spirits Foundation were given other than voluntarily, or 
that they were anything more than previously agreed upon 
membership dues of that association which had certain, definite 
objectives to be achieved for the common good of the members. 
There is also no evidence in the record that petitioner used 
the funds except as the membership intended they be used. 
Justice Edmonds states, however, that "The indictment also 
might be based upon the use of the funds of the Spirits 
Foundation and those deposited in the Research and Public 
Relations Fund. The grand jurors reasonably might conclude 
that all of the major liquor distributors in the Los Angeles 
area would not acquiesce in the use of their funds for an 
unlawful purpose and that Calhoun, in using them for the 
purpose of Bonelli's campaigns, acted as his agent rather 
than for the association." If the grand jury so inferred, 
then it was guilty of the wildest possible speculation. 
During the 1954 campaign a considerable amount of money 
was contributed toward the campaigns of a number of indi-
L 
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rmnmmg :for various public offices by paying portions 
their campaign bills. There is evidence which shows 
that certain printing bills incurred by Mr. Bonelli, or those 
in his behalf, were paid by checks drawn on Spirits 
and the Research Fund; there is also evidence 
a bill :for billboard advertising for Mr. Bonelli's campaign 
and his book were paid by a check drawn on the Research 
Fund or on Spirits Foundation; there is evidence that Spirits 
defrayed part of the cost of printing Mr. Bonelli's 
book. There is evidence that petitioner was seen in Mr. 
's office but there is no evidence that he was there other 
than on business for Spirits Foundation. Justice Edmonds 
makes much of the fact that Calhoun was seen in Bonelli's 
office and that he paid some of Bonelli's campaign expenses 
from that office with Spirits Foundation funds. In my opin-
the only inference to be drawn therefrom is that wholesale 
money was being donated to pay those expenses-a 
again, with which Calhoun was not charged. There is 
no evidence that Mr. Bonelli received any direct cash contri-
butions from these two funds, or that Mr. Calhoun received 
money for personal use other than his salary from the 
Foundation. 
1'he statute ( Elec. Code, § 5002.5) prohibits any elective 
::;tate officer authorized by law to issue licenses from directly, 
or indirectly, soliciting, receiving, or agreeing to receive money 
or any other thing of value, or any promise thereof, from 
any licensee, for any political campaign. The statute was 
designed to prevent the exercise of coercion by those having 
the power to issue, or withhold, licenses upon those desiring 
them. Its construction should be no greater than necessary 
to subserve the purpose sought to be achieved ( Gebardi v. 
Fnite'd States, 287 U.S. 112, 123 [53 S.Ct. 35, 77 L.Ed. 206, 
84 A.L.R. 370]). A statute should be construed with reference 
to its purpose and the evils to be cured thereby (14 Cal.Jur.2d 
~ p. 312; People v. Jackson, 24 Cal.App.2d 182, 198 [7 4 
P.2d 1085] ). Moreover, since the statute under consideration 
is also a criminal one, the one accused of its violation is 
t•ntitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt, whether 
it arises out of a question of fact, or as to the true interpreta-
tion of language used therein. (Ex Parte Rosenheim, 83 CaL 
891 r23 P. 372] ; 14 CaLJnr.2d § 104, p. 310; Downing v. 
Jlunie1:pal Court, 88 Cal.App.2d 345, 349 (198 P.2d 923) ; 
People v. Ralph, 24 Cal.2d 575, 581 [150 P.2d 401]; People v. 
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Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121, 143 [169 P.2d 1]; People v. Show-
alter, 126 Cal.App. 665, 669 [14 P.2d 1034]; In re McVickers, 
29 Cal.2d 264, 278 [176 P.2d 40]; In re Bramble, 31 Cal.2d 
43, 51 [187 P.2d 411].) 
It should be noted here that this statute prohibits only the 
soliciting, receiving, or agreeing to receive money, or its 
equivalent. It does not prohibit an individual licensee, or 
group of such licensees, from voluntarily contributing to such 
official campaign. This court, in construing such a statute, 
should not engraft thereon a provision which the Legislature 
in its wisdom did not see fit to include when enacting the 
measure ( Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 123 [53 S.Ct. 
35, 77 L.Ed. 206, 84 A.L.R. 370]) or extend it by implication 
(In re Stra~d, 125 Cal. 415, 417 [58 P. 62]; Daman v. Hunt, 
47 Cal.App. 274, 280 [191 P. 376]; Bagley v. Ward, 37 Cal. 
121, 133 [99 Am.Dec. 256]; Weimer v. Lowery, 11 Cal. 104, 
112; Burdge v. Underwood, 6 Cal. 45; Chapman v. Aggeler, 
47 Cal.App.2d 848, 853 [119 P.2d 204]; Hossom v. City of 
Long Beach, 83 Cal.App.2d 745, 757 [189 P.2d 787]). Penal 
statutes must be construed to reach no further than their 
words; no person can be made subject to them by implication 
(DeMille v. American Fed. of Radio Artists, 31 Cal.2d 139, 
156 [187 P.2d 769, 175 A.L.R. 382]) and a penal statute may 
not, under any rule of construction, be so read as to reach 
further than its words (In re Twing, 188 Cal. 261, 265 [204 
P. 1082]; Ex parte Kohlet·, 74 Cal. 38, 44 [15 P. 436]; People 
v. Tisdale, 57 Cal. 104, 107; Eustace v. Jahns, 38 Cal. 3, 
19, 21) 0 
Petitioner was charged with "soliciting, asking and receiv-
ing cash political contributions'' from holders of liquor 
licenses. I find nothing in the record to substantiate this 
charge other than his own statement that as executive secretary 
of a trade association he billed members of his association 
for their dues. Before petitioner can be tried under this 
statute the evidence must show that he conspired with Mr. 
Bonelli, a state elective official, and others, to solicit funds 
from holders of liquor licenses. 
In viewing this statute I find, then, that it does not prohibit 
the giving, but only the receiving, of campaign funds from 
licensees. It has been held in numerous cases that conspiracy 
requires, as an essential element, a concert of action of two 
or more persons. 
The rule that conspiracy will not lie where the commission 













CALHOUN v. SuPERIOR CouRT 
f46 C.2d 18; 291 P.2d 474] 
41 
iu the following cases: United States v. Katz 
, 271 U.S. 334 [46 S.Ct. 513, 70 L.Ed. 
] ; Yannata v. United Slates (reeogniziug rule but holding 
under facts), 289 P. 424; Robilio v. United 
(liquor transportation; recognizing rule but holding it 
I·"'""'""U"v under facts), 291 P. 975 ( cert. den. 263 U.S. 716 
S.Ct. 137, 68 L.Ed. 522]); Lisansky v. United States 
\ false partnership ineome tax return; rule reeognized, 
but held inapplieable), 31li'.2d 846, 67 A.L.R. 67 (cert. den. 
, U.S. 87B [49 S.Ct. 514, 73 L.Ed. 1008]); Norris v. United 
(transportation of liquor), 34 F.2d 839; United States 
(bribery), 49 J?.2d 725; Ex parte O'Leary (bribery), 
.2d 956; Cnrtis v. United States (rule recognized, but 
inapplieable under faets), 67 P.2d 943; People v. Wetten-
(bribery), 98 Colo. 193 [58 P.2d 579, 104 A.L.R. 1423] ; 
Commonwealth v. Carroll (statutory rape), 8 Pa.D.&C. 271; 
Commonwealth v. Bricket· (abortion), 74 Pa.Super. 234; Com-
v. Maxberry (receiving stolen goods), 13 Pa.D.&C. 
i United States v. Dietrich (bribery), 126 P. 664; United 
States v. New York Cent. & II. R. R. Co. (illegal rebate), 
1-Hi P. 298. 
In the present case, as in the Gebardi case, if conspiracy 
is held to lie, the very immunity granted by this statute 
implication, withdrawn. 
In addition to the necessity for a concert of action, and 
allird thereto, in conspiraey eases it is necessary that 
tlH.'re be a joint intent and common purpose among those 
accused of eonspiracy to commit a crime or achieve an unlaw-
ful end (People v. lJicJiianis, 122 Cal.App.2d 891, 900 [266 
P 134] ; People v. Yeager, 194 Cal. 452, 484 [229 P. 40] ; 
v. Griffin, 98 Cal.App.2d 1, 43, 44 [219 P.2d 519] ; 
Y. lJiontgomery, 47 Cal.App.2d 1, 11 [117 P.2d 437] ; 
Y. Eiseman, 78 Cal.App. 223, 244 [248 P. 716]; People 
104 Cal.App.2d 402, 414 [231 P.2d 896]; People v. 
36 Cal.2d 234, 236 [223 P.2d 17]). Taking this 
element into consideration, it is doubtful that petitioner could, 
umlf'r the facts here presented, have conspired with Mr. 
Bonelli to reeeive campaign contributions. In an article in 26 
Southern California Law Review, 64, 70, (Criminal Law-
Conspiracy and Conspirators in California) it is said: ''Con-
reach an agreement with a common intent and pur-
poSfJ in mind. This concert of purpose is a necessary element 
Gf the crime. There are a number of crimes which two 
parties ean agree to eommit, but which they cannot conspire 
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enter the agreement with different 
adultery, bigamy and subordation of 
are crimes of this class. [Note, 104 A.L.R. 1430 
1936).] Two parties may conspire to give a bribe [People v. 
98 1, 219 P.2d 519 (1950)) ; they may 
to accept a bribe [People v. Savage, 15 Cal.App.2d 
59 P.2d 190 (1936).]; they may commit bribery, one 
and one accepting [People v. Sheffield, 108 Cal.App. 
721, 293 P. 72 ( 1930).] ; but they cannot conspire to commit 
bribery, one to give and one to accept. [People v. Keyes, 284 
P. 1105 (Cal. 1930), in denying rehearing [sic] on 103 CaL 
App. 624, 284 P. 1096.]" 
In Peop~e v. Keyes, 103 Cal.App. 624, 646 [284 P. 1096], 
this court, in denying a hearing, had this to say: ''In denying 
the petition for hearing in this court after decision by the 
District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division 
Two, in the above-entitled cause, we deem it proper to say 
that we withhold our approval of so much of the opinion 
rendered as holds that in California, contrary to rulings 
elsewhere, an unlawful agreement between two parties, the 
one to give and the other to receive a bribe, may constitute 
a criminal conspiracy. It is true that a set of defendants 
may conspire to give or a set of defendants may conspire to 
receive or accept a bribe, but bribery requires for its consum-
mation the unlawful concert of one or more persons acting 
with one or more other persons having a different motive 
or purpose. That being true, there is in such a case no room 
for the operation of a charge of conspiracy. In the indict-
ment before us Rosenberg and his codefendants, other than 
Keyes, are properly charged with a conspiracy to offer and 
g·ive a bribe to ,;airl clrfendant, hnt as to rlefendant Keyes, 
him~(·lf, a (•riminal conspiracy ran not he properly charged." 
It appears obvious that the rule which holds that there 
cannot be a conspiracy between the donor and donee of a 
bribe stems from the essential requirement that there be a 
common unlawful motive. The giver expects a different type 
of consideration than the donee receives and hence a different 
motive or intent is involved. Assuming for the moment that 
the purposes and objectives of Spirits Foundation were spe-
cifically prohibited by a statute, it is apparent that in paying 
Mr. Bonelli's campaign printing bills, Spirits Foundation 
had a motive entirely different from that of Mr. Bonelli in 
accepting the benefit. Under this rule petitioner could not 
have conspired with Mr. Bonelli because there is no evidence 
L 
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whatsoever to show that he and Mr. Bonelli to solicit 
receive funds from liquor licensees. Here the undisputed 
evidence shows that petitioner was at all times employed by, 
acted as agent for, Spirits Foundation which was the 
of any campaign contributions received Mr. Bonelli 
this source. There is no evidence from which an infer~ 
could be drawn that petitioner at any time acted for, 
or on behalf of, Mr. Bonelli in the solicitation of 
contributions from liquor licensees. 'While it may be inferred 
petitioner and Mr. Bonelli agreed that certain campaign 
contributions would be made, petitioner was always in the 
of the donor and Mr. Bonelli the donee of such 
contributions and there could not have existed the common 
nnlawfulmotive between them which is necessary to constitute 
eriminal conspiracy under the authorities above cited. 
In People v. Bnffum, 40 Cal.2d 709, 722 et seq. [256 P.2d 
, we held that a woman submitting to an abortion cannot 
guilty of a conspiracy with the one committing the abortion. 
We said: ''Section 182 of the Penal Code, which proscribes 
conspiracy to commit a crime, is closely analogous to section 
Both provisions operate generally with respect to crimes 
''"~Hv~ in other statutes, and both designate persons who may 
be punished because of their connection with activities per~ 
taining to such crimes. In our opinion the same reasoning 
which precludes the application of section 31 for the purpose 
of prosecuting a woman as a principal under section 274 
likewise precludes the use of section 182 in prosecuting her 
conspiracy to violate section 274. Since as held in the 
Clapp case f24 Cal.2d 835 ( 151 P.2d 237) (accomplice)], the 
Legislature has expressed an intent that a woman who con-
sents and voluntarily submits to an abortion is not punishable 
under section 274, it clearly did not intend that she should 
punished for conspiracy to violate that statute. Although 
the language of section 182, standing alone, is sufficiently 
broad to include any agreement to proeure an abortion, the 
provision, Jike that in section 31, is general and must yield 
to the specific provision in section 275. Any other construction 
would mean that the coui<pirac.v law conld be used as a device 
defeating the legislative intention of a lesser 
pvLH<L'"J on a woman who violates section 275 than is prescribed 
for a person convicted under section 274. 
"'l'here are many cases arising under other statutes in 
which it has been recognized that a defendant may be liable 
prosecution for com;piracy to commit a given crime even 
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of committing the crime itself. (See 
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 
[60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129]; United 
States Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 [35 S.Ct. 682, 59 L.Ed. 
; People v. W oocl, 145 Cal. 659, 664-665 [79 P. 367] ; 
also cases collected in annotations in 131 A.L.R. 1110, 
1114-1115; 5 A.L.R. 782, 787-791.) This rule, however, does 
not apply where the statutes defining the substantive offense 
disclose an affirmative legislative policy that the conduct of 
one of the parties involved shall be punished. ( Gebarcli v. 
United States, 287 U.S. 112, 121-123 [53 S.Ct. 35, 77 L.Ed. 
206, 84 A.L.R. 370]; In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443 [67 A.2d 141, 
145]; see Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 [66 
S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed 1489]; State v. McLaughlin, 132 Conn.· 
325 [ 44 A.2d 116, 120-121].) Similarly, the rule should not 
be applied where, as here, the Legislature singles out one 
of the parties for special treatment by enacting a statute 
which deals only with the conduct of that person and pro-
vides for a lesser punishment than is given to the other party.'' 
(See also People v. Stone, 89 Cal.App.2d 853, 869 [202 P.2d 
333], wherein it was held that there could be no conspiracy 
in such a case.) In State v. Tennyson, 212 Minn. 158 [2 
N.W.2d 833, 837, 139 A.L.R. 987], the same problem was 
involved and it was held that the one performing the abortion 
and the one submitting thereto could not be conspirators. 
Reliance was placed on the rule that the giving and taking 
of bribes were separate and distinct offenses. 
Here, as in the Buffum case, the Legislature has singled 
out one of the parties for ''special treatment'' by making 
it a crime to solicit, receive, etc., campaign contributions 
from licensees. The Legislature did not see fit in the statute 
under consideration to make it a crime for any licensee to 
contribute voluntarily. Here, the "statutes defining the sub-
stantive offense disclose an affirmative legislative policy that 
the conduct of one of the parties involved shall be un-
punished" (People v. Buffum, at page 722). In Gebardi v. 
United States, 287 U.S. 112, 119-120 [53 S.Ct. 35, 77 L.Ed. 
206, 84 A.L.R. 370], the Supreme Court had this to say: 
"We come thus to the main question in the case, whether, 
admitting that the woman, by consenting, has not violated 
the Mann Act, she may be convicted of a conspiracy with 
the man to violate it. Section 37 of the Criminal Code (18 
U.S.C., § 88), punishes a conspiracy by two or more persons 
'to commit any offense against the United States.' The offense 
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is charged with conspiring to commit is that 
by the man, for it is not questioned that in 
her he contravened section 2 of the Mann Act. 
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 [37 S.Ct. 192, 
61 L.Ed. 442]. Hence >ve must decide whether her con-
lvhich was not criminal before the Mann Act, nor 
by it, may, without more, support a conviction 
the conspiracy section, enacted many years before. 
"As was said in the Holte case (p. 144 [United States v. 
236 U.S. 140 (35 S.Ct. 271, 59 L.Ed. 504, L.R.A. 
1915D 281)]), an agreement to commit an offense may be 
though its purpose is to do what some of the con-
may be free to do alone. Incapacity of one to 
the substantive offense does not necessarily imply 
that he may with impunity conspire with others who are 
able to commit it. For it is the collective planning of criminal 
conduct at which the statute aims. The plan itself is a 
wrong which, if any act be done to effect its object, the state 
has elected to treat as criminal, Clune v. United States, 159 
U.S. 590, 595 [16 S.Ct. 125, 40 L.Ed. 269, 271]. And one 
may plan that others shall do what he cannot do by himself. 
See United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86, 87 [35 
682, 59 L.Ed. 1211, 1214, 42 Am.Bankr.Rep. 255]. 
"But in this case we are concerned with something more 
than an agreement between two persons for one of them 
to commit an offense which the other cannot commit. There 
is the added element that the offense planned, the criminal 
of the conspiracy, involves the agreement of the woman 
to her transportation by the man, which is the very con-
charged .... 
"\Ve do not rest our decision upon the theory of those 
[therefore cited and here omitted] cases, nor upon the 
related one that the attempt is to prosecute as conspiracy 
acts identical with the substantive offense. United States v. 
Dietn:ch, 126 F. 664. We place it rather 1lpon the ground 
that we perceive in the failttre of the JJiann Act to condemn 
the woman's participation in those transportations which 
are effected by her mere consent, evidence of an affirmative 
legislative policy to leave her acquiescence nnpttnishecl. We 
think it a necessary implication of that policy that when 
the Mann Act and the conspiracy statute came to be con-
strued tog·ether, as they necessarily would be, the same par-
ticipation which the former contemplates as an inseparable 
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all caRes in which the woman is a voluntary agent 
hut not was automatically to be made 
U-'-'""'...,"""""J under the latter. It would contravene that policy 
to hold that the very passage the Mann Act effected a 
withdrawal the statute that immun1:ty which 
the Mann Act " (Emphasis added; see also 
Freeman v. Un·ited Stales (conspiracy to commit offense of 
unlawfully selling , 146 F.2d 978; People v. Purcell 
(conspiracy to play poker), 304 Ill.App. 215 [26 N.E.2d 153] ; 
Dodson v. United States (conspiracy to violate Mann Act) 
(Ky.), 215 F.2d 196; United States v. Hagan (conspiracy to 
harbor fug·itive), 27 F.Supp. 814.) 
The third count of the indictment is, apparently, based 
upon the fact that petitioner did not keep detailed books 
and records of his expenditures and that many of the checks 
drawn on both funds were drawn either to him personally 
or to cash. In some instances there were no receipts for 
the monies expended. Petitioner explained that many of 
them were drawn for travelling expenses, salary checks to 
various employees, bills that he had incurred, liquor bills 
where the liquor had been donated by Spirits Foundation 
to charitable organizations, to candidates who did not wish 
their constituents to know that a liquor organization was 
backing them.* Many of these expenditures were listed under 
the heading ''Campaign Contributions.'' There is again no 
evidence which shows, or tends to show, that Mr. Bonelli 
had anything to do with the manner in which petitioner's 
books and records were kept. There is, further, no evidence 
which either shows, or tends to show, that petitioner's books 
were kept with the purpose claimed by the People-that 
they were "misleading, false and deceitful" and so prepared 
"with the intent to allow the same to be produced for fraudu-
lent and deceitful purposes upon trials, proceedings and 
inquiries authorized by law, for the purpose of perverting 
and obstructing justice and the due administration of the 
law." The majority, however, rely on the "Aldine receipt," 
the ''setting up by Woolever of fictitious ledger accounts 
to evidence funds received from Bonelli and Calhoun, the 
checks given to the non-existent Allied Printing Company, 
the substitution of a new check for that made out by the 
Mexican Village to Bonelli's campaign fund, Calhoun's use 
of the Research and Public Relations Fund as a channel for 
*It is inferable that some of these cash checks were used to pay 
printing bills for Mr. Bonelli's eampaign. 
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from the Spirits Foundation, transactions 
the name of the National Democratic Club of California, 
other activities which, a reasonable grand juror might 
were done with the intent to disguise their nature.'' 
have heretofore discussed the '' Aldine receipt.'' So far 
the Woolever fictitious ledger accounts are the 
opinion shows merely that "\Voolever himself set 
account up and at Bonelli's request charged it with three 
one of which was a Spirits Foundation check. There 
nothing to show that Calhoun knew that vVoolever did 
no printing for Proposition 3 or that a Spirits Foundation 
was charged to such an account. The only inference 
to be drawn from such evidence is that Bonelli was guilty 
double-crossing his benefactors. There is no evidence in 
record that Calhoun knew that the Allied Printing Com-
was not in existence and again, the only inference to 
be drawn is that Bonelli was guilty of a subterfuge. So far 
the substitution of a new check for that made out by the 
JHexican Village to Bonelli's campaign fund, that was part 
the mass of evidence relating to Bonelli's program of 
solicitation from retail liquor licensees and the author of 
majority opinion has not succeeded in any way whatsoever 
in connecting Calhoun with that program or with Bonelli's 
participation in that program. The case of the Mexican Vii-
check is another instance where the author of the rna-
opinion has grasped at a tiny particle of immaterial 
evidence in the massive record and tossed it into his horren-
mess. Calhoun's use of Spirits Foundation funds has 
been heretofore discussed in detail and even to the most 
casual reader it must be apparent that the evidence as it 
relates thereto does not lead to an inference that Calhoun 
guilty of solicitation or of keeping false books with the 
purpose charged. The transactions relating to the National 
Democratic Club have nothing at all to do with Calhoun. 
the vaguest recollection of Mr. Kennedy in 1955 that 
he thmtght Calhoun told him in 1950 to bill that club is the 
basis for the statements made in the majority opinion. 
The majority opinion singles out several isolated bits of 
evidenee and from these bits builds unwarranted inference 
upon illogical inference. We are told that on one occasion 
the Aldine Printing Company billed the Business Men's 
Association for $3,000 as a charge for printing some booklets; 
when Weigel told Calhoun of this bill, Calhoun told 
him to write a check on the public relations fund for $1,500; 
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that later Calhoun received from \Veigel cash for the "balance 
of $1507" ($1,500 plus $1,500 equals $3,000; $1,507 plus 
$1,500 equals $3,007) and that later Calhoun presented a 
receipt from the Aldine Printing Company for that amount. 
vV e are then informed that the record shows that the receipt 
was fictitious and did not represent a cash payment but 
was given to acknowledge receipt of several small checks 
made payable to Aldine. Then comes the inference ! That it 
is ''reasonable'' to assume that these checks were from retail 
liquor licensees either in San Diego or Long Beach. vVhat 
the record really shows is this: That Feinstein testified 
that Calhoun had never asked him for a fictitious invoice; 
that Weigel did not say he got the receipt from Calhoun but 
that "We got a receipt from the Alcline Company for the 
$1,507.35, whatever it was--"; that there is not one scrap 
of evidence to show that Calhoun had anything whatsoever 
to do with the receipt or, what is more important, that he 
knew of its so-called fictitious character; that there is abso-
lutely nothing in the record to show what small checks com-
prised the payment. 
The next bit of evidence is the Judson transaction. The 
author of the majority opinion doesn't even try to tie Cal-
houn in with that. The only point in the evidence is that 
Bonelli had a Spirits Foundation check in his possession 
which he asked Judson to cash for him. There is nothing 
to show that Calhoun even knew of the transaction or that 
Judson ever heard of Calhoun. In fact the evidence is to 
the contrary. In the same paragraph, however, we are in-
formed that a check made payable to James Garibaldi was 
"handled the same way." What the record really shows is 
this: That when the check was delivered to Mr. Garibaldi's 
office, he was out of town; that the purpose of the check was 
to pay Mr. Garibaldi for work to be done on Proposition 3; 
that Mr. Garibaldi was informed of this when he telephoned 
his secretary later in the day and at that time told her he 
would not be able to accept the employment; that she de-
posited the check and drew another one payable to Calhoun's 
secretary at his request. From this the majority infer that 
Bonelli and Calhoun acted in concert to use Bonelli's position 
for their private gain in the "Judson and Garibaldi trans-
actions.'' 
Other evidence relied upon by the majority opinion is that 
Calhoun 1vas seen in Bonelli's office; that he there paid, with 
Spirits Foundation funds, certain campaign expenses in-
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by Bonelli. This, again, shows only that Calhoun 
was guilty of violating the statute respecting donations but 
does not have a thing to do with the crime with which he 
charged. While the majority opinion covers numerous 
pages, a close reading thereof will show that these "bits" of 
from which the staggering number of inferences 
drawn are reiterated over and over again-and that the 
balance of the evidence set forth relates only to Bonelli and 
program of solicitation from retail liquor licensees. Be-
cause a witness testified in 1955 that he "thought" Calhoun 
him, in the year 1950, to bill the National Demo-
Club for certain outdoor advertising for Bonelli, it 
inferred that "Calhoun knew that the club would be 
receiving funds to be made available to Bonelli and the source 
of such funds'' and that this is a ''direct link between Cal-
houn and the proceeds from solicitation of retail liquor 
licensees. '' 
\V e are also informed that several thousands of dollars, 
in addition to those received from the Spirits Foundation, 
were deposited in the Research and Public Relations Fund 
>vholesale liquor licensees of whom Calhoun was not an 
and that this was ''direct evidence that Calhoun 're-
ceived' money for Bonelli's campaign and from his intimate 
participation in Bonelli's campaign it is a reasonable inference 
that he acted in concert with Bonelli in doing so." As I 
have said before the only inference which can logically and 
reasonably be drawn is that Calhoun was using wholesale 
funds to support Bonelli's campaign. There is not one 
scintilla of any kind of evidence, direct or otherwise, that 
he had anything to do with the solicitation of those funds; 
or that he conspired with Bonelli in soliciting such funds. 
is no evidence whatsoever that Calhoun was not in 
Bonelli's office on Spirits Foundation business. In fact, the 
entire record shows that he was there on Spirits Foundation 
business. 
The majority is forced to admit that there is nothing in 
the record to link Calhoun with the cashing of retail liquor 
licensee checks by Bonelli but then illogically concludes that 
may reasonably be inferred that these transactions were 
"logical outgrowth of the conspiracy." 
In answer to my argument that there can be no conspiracy 
between the donor and the donee, the author of the majority 
opinion says that there "is little dispute, however, that the 
evidence shows an elaborate conspiracy to utilize contribu-
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from both retail and wholesale liquor licensees to finance 
political campaigns. Inferences which reasonably 
may be drawn from that evidence fully support the conclu-
sion that Calhoun was connected with the general program 
of the Bonelli campaigns in other ways than solely as a 
donor to them.'' The author apparently ran out of inferences 
because he fails to draw any at this point. There is ample 
evidence to show that Calhoun was a donor of Spirits Foun-
dation funds, but the only evidence linking him with Bonelli 
as a solicitor is that he was seen in Bonelli's office. Mere 
association does not make a conspiracy (Dong Haw v. Su-
perior Court, 81 Cal.App.2d 153 [183 P.2d 724]) ; even 
though direct proof of a formal understanding between parties 
to a conspiracy is not required (Lorenson v. Superior' Court, 
35 Cal.2d 49 [216 P.2d 859]). 
We said in People v. Nagle, 25 Cal.2d 216, 222 [153 P.2d 
344], that "It must be remembered that the evidence before 
a committing magistrate at a preliminary examination need 
not be such as would require a conviction. Section 872 of 
the Penal Code provides that the defendant must be held 
to answer if 'it appears from the examination that a public 
offense has been committed, and there is sufficient cause to 
believe the defendant guilty thereof.' Section 1487, subdivi-
sion 7, of the Penal Code provides that a party is entitled to 
discharge upon habeas corpus proceedings where he has 'been 
committed on a criminal charge without reasonable or prob-
able cause'; 'sufficient cause,' therefore, means no more than 
that. (People v. Putnam, 20 Cal.2d 885 [129 P.2d 367] ; 
Cleughv. Strakosch (C.C.A. 9), 109 F.2d 330; In re Martinez, 
36 Cal.App.2d 687 [98 P.2d 528] .) 'Reasonable and prob-
able cause' may exist although there may be some room for 
doubt." (In re McCarty, 140 Cal.App. 473, 474 [35 P.2d 
568] ; In re Mesquita, 139 Cal.App. 91 [33 P.2d 459); Ex 
parte Heacock, 8 Cal.App. 420 [97 P. 77]; Ex parte Vice, 
5 Cal.App. 153 [89 P. 983] .) Applying the above rules 
to this case, it is at once obvious that the evidence at the 
very most leads only to speculation that Calhoun was guilty 
as charged. The strongest evidence produced from which 
even the vaguest inference of his guilt could be drawn is 
that he was seen in Bonelli's office. The author of the ma-
jority opinion confuses the issue by reciting all the evidence 
relating to Bonelli's solicitation and then scrambling that 
evidence with evidence of Calhoun's donation of Spirits 
Foundation funds. Taking the scrambled mess as a whole 
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clear to me that not lead a "man of 
and commientiously 
of the accused.'' 
is much more than some room for doubt here-there 
spceulation that Calhoun is guilty as "Spccu-
' does not measure up to any definition of 
cause with which I am familiar. 
majority opinion here depicts with unusual force the 
in the following quotation from Mr. Justice Jackson's 
opinion in Krnlewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 
445 et seq. [69 S.Ct. 716, 93 L.Ed. 790]: "The un-
protest of courts against the growing habit to indict 
conspiracy in lieu of prosecuting for the substantive 
itself, or in addition thereto, suggests that loose prac-
tice as to this offense constitutes a serious threat to fairness 
in our administration of justice. 
''The modern crime of conspiracy is so vague that it almost 
definition. Despite certain elementary and essential 
"'"un,u"g' it also, chameleon-like, takes on a special coloration 
from each of the many independent offenses on which it may 
overlaid .... 
''An accused, under the Sixth Amendment, has the right 
to trial 'by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein 
the crime shall have been committed.' The leverage of a 
conspiracy charge lifts this limitation from the prosecution 
and reduces its protection to a phantom, for the crime is con-
sidered so vagrant as to have been committed in any district 
where any one of the conspirators did any one of the acts, 
however innocent, intended to accomplish its object. 
''The trial of a conspiracy charge doubtless imposes a heavy 
burden on the prosecution, but it is an especially difficult 
situation for the defendant. The hazard from loose applica-
tion of rules of evidence is aggravated where the Government 
institutes mass trials. . . . 
"A co-defendant in a conspiracy trial occupies an uneasy 
There generally will be evidence of wrongdoing by 
It is difficult for the individual to make his own 
stand on its own merits in the minds of jurors who 
ready to believe that birds of a feather are flocked to-
If he is silent, he is taken to admit it and if, as often 
happens, co-defendants can be prodded into accusing or con-
tradicting each other, they convict each other. There are 
many practical difficulties in defending against a charge of 
conspiracy which I will not enumerate. . . . 
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''There is, of course, strong temptation to relax rigid 
standards when it seems the only way to sustain convictions 
of evil-doers. But statutes authorize prosecution for sub-
stantive crimes for most evil-doing without the dangers to 
the liberty of the individual and the integrity of the judicial 
process that are inherent in conspiracy charges. We should 
disapprove the doctrine of implied or constructive crime in 
its entirety and in every manifestation. .And I think there 
should be no straining to uphold any conspiracy conviction 
where prosecution for the substantive offense is adequate and 
the purposes served by adding the conspiracy charge seems 
chiefly to get procedural advantages to ease the way to con-
viction.'' 
I have heretofore shown that the statute (Elec. Code, 
§ 5002.5) proscribes only the solicitation or receipt of cam-
paign contributions from licensees and not the giving thereof. 
I have also carefully examined the record and have failed 
to :find any evidence to substantiate the charge that petitioner 
conspired with Mr. Bonelli in either soliciting or receiving 
funds for Mr. Bonelli's campaign. I :find only that petitioner, 
as executive secretary of a trade association, Spirits Founda-
tion, received dues from its members, a percentage of which 
funds were used voluntarily to pay printing and advertising 
bills for Mr. Bonelli in his campaign for reelection to the 
State Board of Equalization. Inasmuch as the Legislature 
did not see :fit to make the voluntary donation of such funds 
a crime under this statute, it follows that there is no evidence 
connecting petitioner with the crimes charged in the indict-
ment and the writ should therefore issue. 
I would, therefore, let the writ of prohibition issue as 
prayed for. 
SCHAUER, J., dissenting. 
Because the record in this case discloses what appear to 
have been widespread and unlawful practices of a highly 
unsavory character, participated in by persons with whom 
this petitioner had dealings or was employed, and, as to 
certain activities, by himself, it is difficult to confine our 
thinking to the narrow legal question upon which we must 
rule . 
.As to the law generally as stated in the majority opinion 
I am in full accord with the principles there expressed but 
in careful detailing of the evidence, and as to the law which 
by our prior decisions should be applicable upon the facts 
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impelled to the conclusion that Mr. Justice Carter's dis-
is well taken. 
The majority opinion correctly summarizes the charges 
in counts 1, 2 and 3 of the indictment. Each and 
those counts confine their charges of criminality by 
to acts committed in confederation with board 
Bonelli either in soliciting and collecting contribu-
tions for him and his objectives, or a like confederation "to 
prepare misleading, false and deceitful papers ... with the 
intent to allow the same to be produced for fraudulent .. . 
purposes ... for the purpose of perverting ... justice ... " 
is my view that the entire record, fairly considered, 
leads unmistakably to the conclusion that at least as to the 
first two counts the grand jury proceedings were conducted 
on the theory that it was unlawful for a licensee to contribute, 
yoluntarily or otherwise, to a campaign fund of any member 
of the Board of Equalization. Section 5002.6 of the Elections 
Code expressly covers such a situation and the evidence 
appears amply sufficient to establish that the petitioner's 
employers 1vere licensees, and that they did make and that 
petitioner participated in making, such prohibited contribu-
tions. However, for some reason which is not readily apparent, 
the indictment which was returned does not charge violation 
of, or conspiracy to violate, section 5002.6. Instead, as here-
inabove indicated, it specifically charges the petitioner with 
(Count I) conspiring with board member Bonelli to violate 
section 5002.5 of the Elections Code in that they did "felo-
niously combine ... and agree together to commit the crimes 
of soliciting, asking and receiving cash political contribu-
tions and ... things of monetary value from persons who 
·were named in licenses to sell alcoholic beverages issued by 
tlle Board of Equalization"; (Count II) with conspiring 
with the board member and others "to do acts injurious to 
the public morals and to pervert and obstruct justice and 
the due administration of the laws; ... to use the ... offi-
cial position of membership of the Board of Equalization 
. . . for the private gain of said co-conspirators in that said 
defendants and their co-conspirators did agree among them-
selves that they would unlawfully collect funds from licensees 
and applicants for licenses of the Board of Equalization 
... "; and (Count III) with confederation in the preparation 
of false papers or records, as hereinabove indicated. 
I a.grre with the holding of the majority that the statute 
!J4 CALHOUN v. SuPERIOR CouRT [46 C.2d 
in question Code, § 5002.5) is a valid exercise of the 
police power and that, as held in Bompensiero v. Superior 
Court (1955), 44 Cal.2d 178, 183-184 (281 P.2d 250], an 
indictment will not be set aside or a prosecution thereon 
prohibited if there is a rational for the conclusion 
that an offense has been committed and the accused is guilty 
of it. But the offense for which there is a rational ground 
of believing the defendant must be the offense which 
is charged in the indictment. we held that 
''A. person cannot be convicted of an offense (other than a 
necessarily included offense) not charged against him by 
indictment or information, whether or not there was evidence 
at his trial to show that he had committed that offense." 
(In re Hess (1955), 45 Cal.2d 171, 174-175 [288 P.2d 5].) 
Upon the record before us I see no rational ground upon 
which any of the charges laid against petitioner could be 
sustained. Conceivably, he might be convicted (since the 
grand jury indicted) if the evidence in the record were 
presented to a jury, but upon appeal (or even on habeas 
corpus) on such a record I think we should be bound to re-
verse. The conviction would no more be tenable than the 
conviction in the Hess case, supra. True, the rule is different 
on this proceeding from what it would be on appeal, and I 
have already indicated my recognition of that difference by 
my reference to Bornpensiero v. Superior Cour't (1955), supra, 
44 Cal.2d 178, 183-184, but the record here does not with-
stand the Bompensiero test. I cite the Hess case to illustrate 
the futility of putting the state and the defendant to the 
expense of a trial on an indictment charging specific offenses 
but upon evidence which proves other offenses. 
For the reasons stated I would issue the writ of prohibition. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied ,Jan-
nary 25, 1956. Carter, J., and Schauer, ,J., were of the opinion 
i hat the application should be granted. 
